other Academics, technologists and other experts call for a key role in EU Technology Roadmap on encryption We are concerned that the foreseen framework for access to data by law enforcement authorities risks undermining the exercise of fundamental rights and our collective cybersecurity. 05.05.2025
Article The right to explanation of creditworthiness assessment – first such law in Europe Thanks to Panoptykon’s initiative bank customers in Poland will have the right to receive explanation of their creditworthiness. It’s the first right of this kind in Europe and a higher standard than the one envisioned in the GDPR. 12.06.2019 Text
Article Why should you know who has been asking about you?, re:publica 2014 [VIDEO] In the post-Snowden world we became well aware that data we store on servers belonging to private companies tends to have a second life. It is where secret services and law enforcement meet the Internet. How to prevent bulk transfers from private to public data bases? How to make sure that due process is in place? What do we know about disclosures of our data and how can we learn more? Katarzyna Szymielewicz explains, what we should know about state authorities access to citizens data and why. She also presents the results of Panoptykon Foundation’s research on public authorities’ access to the data of Internet services users. 05.06.2014 Text
Article Personal Data: Nothing to hide?, re:publica 2013 [VIDEO] Do we really need data protection in this world? Katarzyna Szymielewicz (Panoptykon Foundation) and Jérémie Zimmermann (La Quadrature du Net) talk about usage of data collected in Internet by private companies and changes that new data protection regulation could bring, including explicit consent for data processing as a rule, information about data processing presented in clear manner, regulation of profiling and privacy by default concept. 06.05.2013 Text
Article Open Source Surveillance And Online Privacy, CPDP 2014 [VIDEO] Access of the law enforcement agencies and secret services upon more or less formal warrants and request do not cover the whole problem of the online surveillance. More and more date is available out there without any warrants – just to read, take and process. It is the situation, when the data that we all publish online, with more or less awareness of the consequences, is used by authorities mention above for whatever purposes. How purpose limitation could possibly be used to limit open source surveillance? To what extent privacy settings that by default enable or enhance making data public help in conducting this type of surveillance? How open source surveillance might influence individual? 24.01.2014 Text